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COMMENTARY
JUSTICE ROBINSON AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH DAKOTA
Robert Vogel*
North Dakota's 1916 election was probably the most epochal
in its history. The Nonpartisan League swept into power with a
mandate to enact its program, including state ownership of some
businesses and regulation of others. The general history of the
period has been told many times by observers and participants,
both partial and impartial.
Little attention, however, has been devoted to the legal history
of the era, the most colorful period in the judicial history of the
State. I propose to offer some notes on this subject.
By an accident of history, three of the five justices of the North
Dakota Supreme Court were elected in 1916. Under the 1889 Con-
stitution there were three supreme court justices elected for six-
year terms,1 but the constitution was amended in 1908 to provide
for a court made up of five justices. 2 Two additional justices were
elected in 1910, along with a third to fill the vacancy caused by the
ending of the terms of one of the three incumbent justices. The
three elected in 1910 were Justices C. J. Fisk, E. B. Goss, and E. T.
*Professor of Law, University of North Dakota; Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court, 1973-
1978; L.L.B., Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law, 1942; Member of the North Dakota Bar.
1. N.D. CoNsT. of 1889, art. 4, §S89, 91.
2. Id. § 89 (amended 1908).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Burke (not related to John Burke or ThomasJ. Burke, later justices
of the court). All three of those elected in 1910 were defeated by
substantial margins in a Nonpartisan League sweep in the election
of 1916.
Elections to the court were partisan in those days, and the
three successful candidates were endorsed by the Nonpartisan
League. They were Richard H. Grace, Luther Birdzell, and.James
E. Robinson. They joined the two holdover justices, Andrew A.
Bruce, who was Chief Justice, and A. M. Christianson, who was
destined to serve for more than thirty-nine years, the longest term
of service of any justice in the history of North Dakota.
Of the five justices on the bench in 1917-1923, James E.
Robinson was by far the most colorful. He was a veteran of the
Civil War and was seventy-five years of age when he took office.
He had a full beard and looked like an Old Testament prophet. He
was apparently reluctant to give his age, since it is not included in
several of the standard biographical references, including his own
"official biography" in his book, Wrong& and Remedies.3 He
had other peculiarities also. He is reputed to have worn his hat
regularly in the courtroom and to have walked out of the courtroom
in the middle of arguments if he thought he had heard enough from
the lawyer arguing the case. 4 He read the briefs iln advance and, if
he decided the case was a simple one, he would write a tentative
opinion and send it to the lawyers before the oral argument so they
could save the trip to Bismarck if they agreed with the opinion.
5 It
is doubted that both sides agreed very often, and it is certain that
the otherjudges often disagreed with him.
Robinson had been a law partner of William Lemke, one of
the founders of the early Nonpartisan League, but a bitter enemy
of the later (1932 and thereafter) Nonpartisan League. Within six
months of taking office, however, Robinson was considered a
traitor to the League by A. C. Townley, its principal founder, who
reportedly would not speak to Robinson. Robinson occasionally
referred in his opinions to Lemke as the "Bishop of the
Nonpartisan League" and severely criticized some League policies,
both in his opinions and in his book .
6
There are several things about Robinson's opinions that are
striking to a lawyer-reader. The most astonishing is Robinson's
attitude toward prior decisions (precedents). He not only did not
3..J. ROBINSON, WRONGS AND REMEDIES (1923).
4. U. BURDICK, GREATJUDGES AND LAWYERS OF EARLY NORTH DAKOTA 8 (1956),
5..J. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 75.
6.1. ROBINSON, supra note 3.
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feel obligated to follow them - he usually disregarded them
completely. In his first year on the court, when he wrote the
amazing total of forty-eight opinions of the court, thirty-one
dissents with opinions, and twenty-nine concurrences with opinions
(a total of one hundred and eight written opinions),7 only eight
contained citations to case law. Twenty-two of the opinions cite
statutes, four cite the North Dakota Constitution, three cite
Shakespeare, four the Bible, and one Blackstone. About eighty
percent of the cases cite neither case nor constitutional law. The
following year, 1918, Robinson wrote twenty-eight opinions of the
court, twenty-one dissents with opinion, and twenty concurrences
with opinion. His record as to citation improved somewhat, with
thirty citations to statutes, twelve to decisions, two to Shakespeare,
and one each to the Bible, the Constitution, and Oliver Goldsmith.
Robinson was an opinionated man. His opinions show that he
was opposed to Prohibition, inheritance taxes, and many of the
Nonpartisan League regulatory measures. They also indicate that
he strongly believed in deciding each case on what appeared to him
to be the justice of that particular case. He was the most colorful
writer of that or any other period in the history of the court.
Illustrations will be found later in this commentary.
Robinson's chief opponent on the court was Chief Justice
Andrew A. Bruce, who also had a somewhat colorful background,
but a more orthodox point of view..Justice Bruce was born in India,
where his father was a general in the British Army. His early
education was in England, where he became an orphan at fifteen.
He came to the United States by himself, worked as a farm laborer,
and attended law school in Wisconsin and Illinois, where he helped
.Jane Addams organize Hull House. He then taught law at the
University of Wisconsin, where he was assistant dean, and he later
became Dean of the School of Law at the University of North
Dakota. He was appointed to the North Dakota Supreme Court by
Governor.John Burke to replace.Justice Morgan, who had resigned
thirteen months before the end of his term. Bruce was elected to a
full term in 1912. He served most of that term, but resigned on
December 1, 1918, returning to teaching at the University of
Minnesota Law School from 1918 to 1923,8 and at Northwestern
University Law School until his death in 1934. Justice Bruce
became a bitter enemy of the Nonpartisan League, probably as a
7. This is a total never exceeded by any justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court to date.
8. He left the University. of Minnesota Law School for better pay at Northwestern. R. STEIN, IN
PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE, A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL 79 (1980).
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result of its attack on the court and its decisions during his service
on the court, and he wrote a highly critical book about the
Nonpartisan League. 9 He also wrote books on law, one of which
was severely criticized in a book review' ° by Felix Frankfurter, later
Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He became a
nationally recognized authority on prison reform and wrote much
on the subject."I
The other three justices are somewhat shadowy figures. Justice
Grace was from Mohall, and was described as having socialist
inclinations. 12 He wrote the longest opinions of the five members of
the court, and was the most likely to dissent without an opinion or
to concur without an opinion - a practice I think should be
criticized since it indicates that the justice disagrees with the
opinion but cannot explain why. On the other hand, when Grace
did write, his views appear to be the most modern of the five
members of the court. For example, he was an early advocate of
leaving questions of assumption of risk to juries to decide,13 rather
than deciding them as a matter of law, an all-too-frequent practice
in those days. He also held modern views on the responsibility of
employers for acts of so-called independent contractors. 14
.Justice Birdzell wrote somewhat fewer opinions than the other
justices in 1917 and 1918 and also wrote fewer dissents and
concurrences than the other justices. After serving sixteen years
and ten months on the court, he went to California where he was
attorney for the Bank of America for many years.
.Justice Christianson probably held as strong opinions as
Robinson or Bruce. At least he was second only to Robinson in the
number of dissents and concurrences with opinion. During the
9. A. BRUCE, NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE (1921).
10. Frankfurter, Book Review, New Republic, April 23, 1924, (reviewing A. BRUCE, THE
AMERICAN JUDGE (1924)) reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, EXTRA-JUDICIAL
ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 149 (P. Kurland ed. 1970). Bruce's earlier book,
Property and Society (1916), had been criticized by Harold Laski as "childish," and "uncritical,
unilluminating and unscholarly." 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 48, 50 (M. Howe ed. 1953). These
comments are omitted from the abridged paperback edition.
The book, Property and Society, however, contained some rather modern views for its day. For
example, Bruce disagreed with the then prevalent view of the equality of workers and employers in
negotiating wages and working conditions, which resulted in upholding sweatshop wage agreements
under the "freedom of contract" theory. He also believed, contrary to the current opinion at the
time, that workmen's compensation laws were constitutional. A. BRUCE, PROPERTY AND SOCIETY
129-35 & 94-95 (1916).
11. See, e.g., A. BRUCE, THE WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE
SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS (1928).
12. See R. MORLAN, POLITICAL PRAIRIE FIRE, THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE, 1915-1922 at 75
(1955).
13. See, e.g., Yuha v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 42 N.D. 179, 171 N.W. 851 (1918)
(action for damages for negligent construction, operation, and maintenance of a coal shed).
14. See, e.g., Montain v. City of Fargo, 38 N.D. 432, 166 N.W. 416 (1917) (Grace, .J.,
dissenting) (relation between City of Fargo and garbageman was one of master and servant and not
independent contractor).
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1917-1918 period, he was probably more traditional in his views
than any of the justices, even Bruce.
When the three new justices took office in January 1917, there
were, according to Robinson, 150 cases on the docket and
undecided. 15 It is not clear whether this figure included all cases
docketed, including some in which briefs were not yet due, whether
it included only cases ready for argument, or whether it included
only cases fully argued and submitted. Whichever it was, the figure
was high. When I joined the court in 1973, there were fifty cases
argued and not decided, and at least once each year since then the
comparable figure has been reduced to zero.
The 1917 court deserves credit for tackling its backlog and
disposing of it. That it did so is indicated by the fact that in 1917 it
decided 207 cases with written opinions, probably the highest
number of any year in the history of the court. 16 In 1918 it decided
117 cases with opinions, which probably indicates that the backlog
had been well disposed of in 1917.
In disposing of that backlog, Justice Robinson wrote the most
opinions.17 Of course, it was easier for Robinson to write the
enormous number of opinions he did because he cited so tew
authorities. Another factor that entered into the number of
opinions he wrote was that, as mentioned earlier, he had the
unprecedented custom of writing opinions in advance and releasing
them in advance. It is quite apparent that he used these advance
opinions as proposed opinions when the case was assigned to him.
If the case was assigned to someone else, and he agreed with the
opinion drafted by the other justice, he might not file his own, but if
he agreed with the result but not the reasoning, he would file his
own as a concurring opinion. If he disagreed with the result and the
reasoning, he would file his own previously written opinion as a
dissent.
Another custom of Robinson's, which surely must have
infuriated his colleagues, was to write a weekly newspaper column
about the court. The columns were called his "Saturday Night
Letters ' 18 and gave his opinions on a great variety of subjects,
including some matters before the court. A few of the "Saturday
15..J. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 80.
16. Higher figures have been cited for the North Dakota Supreme Court in recent years, but
they include motions disposed of without opinion.
17. In disposing of that backlog, Robinson wrote 48 of the 207 opinions in 1917 and 28 of the
117 opinions in 1918. In 1917 Robinson wrote 29 concurring opinions, 31 dissents, and 5
concurrences in the result. In 1918 Robinson wrote 20 concurrences with opinion, 21 dissents, and 8
concurrences in the result.
18. U. BURDICK, supra note 4, at 8. See also R. MORLAN, supra note 11, at 99.
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Night Letters" are reprinted in his book, 19 and include comments
on such diverse subjects as Adam and Eve, hints on health,
Bolshevism, vaccination, Prohibition, hints on grammar and
composition, and an "official biography" of the author.20 The
book also contains a number of sensible comments on court
backlogs, brief opinions, writing clearly and grammatically, and
other subjects, as well as some other comments which now seem
bizarre. 21
The response of other members of the court to Robinson's
peculiarities was varied. Often they merely wrote that they agreed
with Robinson's result in his opinions for the court, without
dissenting or writing concurrences. Sometimes when this
happened, there would be a petition for rehearing, pointing out the
lack of authority or the extravagant language in the opinion, which
was offensive to the losing attorney or client. If this happened and
Robinson decined to modify the opinion, some other of the justices
would sometimes write an opinion denying a rehearing but
providing a more orthodox explanation.
22
Sometimes, however, the other justices were not sufficiently
diligent, and Justice Robinson smuggled something into his
opinion that must not have been noticed by the others. For
example, in York v. General Utilities, 23 three of the judges (Robinson,
Bruce, and Birdzell) seemed to be in agreement that comparative
negligence should have been applied in an ordinary negligence
case.2 4 Aside from Federal Employees' Liability Act 25 cases, this is
the only instance I know of in which comparative negligence was
approved by the North Dakota Supreme Court until the statute was
changed many years later. 26
Another somewhat surprising aspect of the same case is that
Bruce and Christianson (the holdover, non-Nonpartisan League
judges) thought that a verdict of $15,000 for electrical burns was
not excessive, while the supposedly liberal Nonpartisan League
19. See.J. ROBINSON, supra note 3.
20. Id. at 7 (Adam and Eve), 49 (hints on health), 91 (Bolshevism), 120 (Prohibition), 110
(vaccination), 176 (hints on grammar and composition), 279 ("official biography").
21. See, e.g., id. at 190 (chapter entitled "Suckers and Spoilers"); id. at 216 (chapter entitled
"Turning Water into Wine").
22. See, e.g., York v. General Utilities, 41 N.D. 137, 141, 170 N.W. 312, 313 (1918)
(Christianson, .1., concurring) (although lower court had erred in its instructions, it was not a matter
of law that evidence of negligence was lacking or that contributory negligence existed); Frame v.
North Dakota Grain and Lumber Co., 41 N.D. 172, 176, 170 N.W. 307, 308 (1918) (Birdzell,.J.,
concurring) ("remarks concerning counsel are uncalled for").
23.41 N.D. 137, 170 N.W. 312 (1918).
24. Id. at 140-41, 170 N.W. at 313.
25. Pub. L. No. 100, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (West 1972)).
26. 1973 N.D. Sess. Law ch. 78, 5 1 (codified at N.D. CENT. CooE 9-10-07 (1975)).
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judges (Robinson, Grace, and Birdzell) thought the verdict was
excessive.
17
This leads me to another observation: the election of the three
Nonpartisan League judges did not have as great an effect on
the philosophy of the court as must have been expected. Of course,
Robinson turned out to be a disappointment to the Leaguers, since
he spoke up in opposition to House Bill 44,28 one of the principal
measures of the Nonpartisan League. This Bill would have
amended the constitution of the state to permit state owned
industries. But even aside from House Bill 44, there is no distinct
political grouping to be found in the court opinions. So far as I can
see, Robinson dissented as readily from opinions of Grace and
Birdzell as he did from opinions of Bruce and Christianson, and
they often dissented from his. There is no visible pattern of voting
shown in the court decisions. There were no blocs on the 1917-1918
North Dakota Supreme Court or, rather, there were five of them.
A more independent group of judges could hardly be imagined. Of
the 117 cases decided in 1918, only 29 had no special concurrences
or dissents, and of the 207 cases decided in 1917, only 84 had
neither special concurrences nor dissents. I suspect the percentage
of special concurrences and dissents in 1917 and 1918 is the highest
in the history of the court.
I mentioned earlierJustice Robinson's disdain for precedents.
He gave his view of them in a dissent in McHenry County v. Brady:29
In this case there is no use of talking of resjudicata or
the force of any prior decision binding on this court.
Though it is the custom of courts to adhere to their own
blunders and pile error upon error, the nefarious custom
is not a law, and the custom is of less force when a party
invokes a prior decision made by a bare majority of one
judge, or by three judges voting against three judges,
including the trial .judge.
30
This lack of respect for precedent, which Robinson would have
defended as necessary to do justice in each individual case,
sometimes led him to contradict himself. To take one example, in
Patterson Land Co. v. Lynn, 3 1 he dissented from the denial of a motion
27.41 N.D. at 140-41, 170 N.W. at 313.
28. 15th Leg,, 1917 HouseJournal 331.
29, 37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917).
30. McHenry County v. Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 84, 163 N.W. 540, 549 (1917).
31, 36 N.D. 341, 162 N.W. 702 (1917).
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to recall a remittitur, the motion being made years after the case
was decided by the supreme court. Citing no authority, he said,
"The court has ample power to order a new trial and there is no
justice in denying it."132 But in Nordby v. Sorlie, 3 3 decided less than
three months later, he wrote the opinion of the court denying a
second petition for rehearing filed seven months after the prior
motion was denied, saying that even if the decision was wrong,
"that would be no sufficient reason for allowing the motion to
reconsider. There must be an end to litigation. ,,34
It is not surprising that Justice Robinson's peculiarities did not
escape comment in legal journals. Chief Justice Bruce himself, no
doubt out of a sense of frustration, wrote an article entitled
"Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States."15 In that
article he defended the written opinion and stare decisis:
There is at the present time a judge upon the bench,
James E. Robinson by name, who for many years has
propounded this theory [government by men, not law] at
the hustings and who has at last been elected upon it by
an overwhelming majority, and this against one of the
best lawyers that the state has ever produced. If elected he
promised to decide cases on the argument without
opinions and without leaving the courtroom. In many
instances he has not only lived up to this theory so far as
he was concerned, but in some instances he has come into
court with an opinion already written before counsel have
even been heard from.
Every Saturday night he publishes a letter in the
newspapers in which he prints these alleged opinions, and
often before they have even been read by the other
members of the court. In nine cases out of ten, indeed,
they are never concurred in at all, and the other members
are compelled to rewrite them, to be met merely with a
caustic dissent and another article in the papers stating
that the case was needlessly delayed, rewritten and was
not decided by the majority of the court for some days or
weeks, when it was merely a kindergarten case; and that
it was decided by him rightly though contrary to the views
of the majority, upon or before the hearing, and that the
32. Patterson Land Co. v. Lynn, 36 N.D. 341, 346, 162 N.W. 702, 704(1917).
33. 37 N.D. 288, 163 N.W. 833 (1917).
34. Nordby v. Sorlie, 37 N.D. 288, 289, 163 N.W. 833, 833 (1917).
35. Bruce,Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States, 88 CENT. L.J. 136 (1919).
COMMENTARY
delay has only produced an erroneous judgment and was
insisted upon merely to allow time for the writing of
opinions which were absolutely unnecessary. 
3 6
Justice Robinson responded 37 with an admission that he was
peculiar - in insisting that judges devote full time to their office, in
keeping opinions short and concise, and in being prepared when he
heard oral arguments.3 8 He stated:
It is true that I have little regard for old, obsolete or
erroneous decisions and prefer to decide every case in
accordance with law, reason and justice. I do never -
like Pontius Pilate - wash my hands and blame the law
or a precedent or party zeal for an unjust decision. I do
not believe in building error upon error.
39
He then mentioned several cases he considered unjust. 40 All in all,
it was an interesting exchange.
Justice Robinson was the subject of an article by the eminent
legal scholar, Max Radin, who compared him to a well known
French judge holding somewhat similar views. 41 Professor Radin
was critical of the French judge, and more critical still of.Justice
Robinson.4 2
Perhaps I can close this digressive commentary with a few
examples of the writing style of Justice Robinson. The following is
an entire opinion involving a grade-crossing collision: "I approve
this decision. It would be a great detriment to the public if railway
trains were to move like teams. They must go. It is the duty of
every person to use great care and caution in crossing a railroad
track. ',43
Following are some other examples of Justice Robinson's
colorful style:
This action arises on one of those long, hard, cut-
throat cropping contracts, reserving to the landowner title
36. Id. at 136-37.
37. Robinson, "Peculiarities" in the Administration of.Justice in North Dakota -Justice Robinson's
Explanation, 88 CENT. L..1 155 (1919).
38. Id. at 156.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Radin, The Good.Jud4 e of Chateau - Thierry and His Americaa Counterpart, 10 CAL. L. REV. 300
(1922).
42. Id. at 306-09. Seealso Note, Rule and Discretion in the Administration a/Justice, 33 HARV. L. REV.
972 (1919-1920).
43. Crowson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 36 N.D. 100, 105, 161 N.W. 725, 726
(1916).
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to the crops until the producer complies with numerous
conditions. 4
In reading the decisions of this court and the statutes
of the state it must be remembered that under the
Constitution every man has a remedy by due process of
law for all injuries done him in his person or property. He
does not have to run all round Robin Hood's barn. He
may demand of the courts right and justice, without sale,
denial, or delay.
It is needless to waste time in reviewing decisions on
so simple a matter. The order overruling the demurrer
and the judgment are affirmed.
45
In Fargo, North Dakota, there was an old resident
named Hagen. He scorned delights and lived laborious
days, and when about to depart for the land of rest he
transferred all his property by will to a brother in
Wisconsin, a sister in California, and to a sister in
Norway, whose transfer tax of 25 percent was $8,000....
In this case the majority decision is based on the laws of
feudalism, not on the Constitution of our State. The
reasoning is based on the rules of law which resulted from
the Norman Conquest, but the State does not stand in the
place of William the Conqueror. It is no Lord
Paramount. It has no kingly prerogatives. It does not
exist by divine right. It is merely a corporate entity which
we, the people, have devised for the purpose of protecting
our natural rights, and it has no right to rob any person.
The Inheritance Tax Law shows on its face that it is
a thief and a robber. . . . If such an unjust system of
taxation and confiscation has been sustained in any State
under a similar constitution, it is because the judges did
not know any better, and because they give to modern
constitutions and the natural rights of man less
consideration than they do to the laws of feudalism. 46
44. Walker v. Paulson, 36 N.D. 213,214, 162 N.W. 299,299 (1917).
45. Bismarck Water Supply Co. v. County of Burleigh, 36 N.D. 191, 195, 161 N.W. 1009,
1009-10 (1917). Robinson is paraphrasing the North Dakota Constitution. N.D. CosT. of 1889, art.
1, § 9. The language can be traced to the Magna Charta. Magna Charta, para. 40, reprinted in N.D.
CENT. CODE VOL. 13 (1981).
46. Moody v. Hagen, 36 N.D. 471, 491-93, 162 N.W. 704, 709-10(1917).
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In writing this dissenting opinion, I do solemnly
thank God that my love for right and justice is far above
any regard for my office. I am in no way dependent on
the office and I have little regard for it, only so far as it
presents an opportunity to sustain the right and to
denounce the wrong. This I say, because in writing this
opinion I am sure to give offense to a large class of zealous
and well-organized people who make and unmake judges.
(Who enters here leaves hope behind.)
47
In this case it is extremely difficult to write a dissent
without using some swear words .... That is awful!48
It is right to forbid the sale of drinks to Indians,
minors, to some persons of Celtic blood, and to any
person who does not know enough to care for himself and
his family; but to forbid a taste of wine, beer, ale, or
Dublin stout to an Anglo-Saxon or a Teuton, why that is
cruelty. And, cruelty, thou art a wickedness.
At the Grand Pacific I have a nice, exclusive
bachelor apartment ($45 a month). Now, if the
Governor, the Bishop,4 9 or one of the Justices call on me
and I open a bottle of foamy Dublin stout - my elixir of
life - and for his stomach's sake or for good fellowship
give him a glass and join him in a drink with a thousand
earnest wishes for his health and happiness, does that
make my nice exclusive apartment a common nuisance?
If I call on the good Bishop, and he treats me to a glass or
a bottle of wine, does that turn his palace into a common
nuisance? If not, then is there one law for the palace and
another law for the cottage?
50
In so small a case it were [sic] an act of folly to waste
time in writing a grave discussion on numerous
hairsplitting and frivolous objections. The judgment is
affirmed.51
47. State v. Webb, 36 N.D. 235, 246-47, 162 N.W. 358, 362-63 (1917). In Webb, Justice
Robinson assailed prohibition and came very close to accusing his fellow Judges of violating the
corrupt practice law by signing a pledge, in advance of election, to support the prohibitionists.
48. Blumardt v. McDonald, 36 N.D. 518, 524-25, 162 N.W. 409, 412 (1917).
49. This may be a reference to William Lemke, the Congressman, rather than a religious
official. Robinson often called Lemke "the Bishop." And "palace" could refer to the house Lemke
built in Fargo, partly with funds borrowed under the State Home Building Association Law, which
he violated by building a more expensive home than the law allowed. See E. ROBINSON, HISTORY OF
NORTH DAKOTA 345 & 350 (1966).
50. Scott v. State, 37 N.D. 90, 97-98, 163 N.W. 813, 816 (1917).
51. Steen v. Neva, 37 N.D. 40, 47, 163 N.W. 272, 275 (1917).
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This is an action for the specific performance of a
listing land contract. The plaintiff is an irresponsible
nonresident corporation, and it never put up a dollar on
the contract. That alone is quite enough to show that the
plaintiff has no standing in a court of equity.
The land contract is in the form of a sharp listing
agreement, such as a party may be induced to sign when
he is tricked or hypnotized, or when he has taken leave of
his senses.
52
When a party attempts to purchase land at a tax sale
and to get interest at the rate of 24 per cent., with a
penalty of 5 per cent., he has no reason to complain if he
gets back only his principal with 6 per cent. interest.
Shylock did not fare so well when he insisted on the pound
of flesh. He forfeited his principal sum of 3,000 ducats
and had to become a Christian and to convey half his
property to his daughter, Jessica, who had wed a
Christian.
53
it is exceedingly nervy for anyone to appeal such a
case to this court or to any court.
54
In the conduct of a lawsuit there is a time for candor
and fairness. There is no time for deception, duplicity, or
boy play.
55
When a cropping contract is in microscopic print
which cannot be read without straining the eyes, and
when, by such means, it is turned into an impressive
chattel mortgage, it deserves no favor of the courts.
56
The defense is a pure and manifest sham, and it well
deserves a severe rebuke.
57
When this court certifies that a person is competent
and may safely be trusted to give counsel and to defend
the rights of suitors, it becomes the duty of the court to
make good its certificates by guarding the rights of the
poor and ignorant when their counsel failed them.
58
52. M. Sigbert Awes Co. v. Haslam, 37 N.D. 122, 131, 163 N.W. 265, 267(1917).
53. Davidson v. Kepner, 37 N.D. 198, 203, 163 N.W. 831, 832 (1917).
54. Bready v. Moody, 38 N.D. 321, 328, 164 N.W. 946, 948 (1917).
55. Bentler v. Bryniolfson, 38 N.D. 401, 413, 165 N.W. 553, 557 (1917).
56. Hopperv. Howard, 39 N.D. 83, 85, 166 N.W. 511,511 (1917).
57. Gilbert Mfg. Co. v. Bryan, 39 N.D. 13, 27, 166 N.W. 805, 809 (1918).
58. Fischer v. Dolwig, 39 N.D. 161, 180, 166 N.W. 793, 799 (1918).
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It should not be accounted a libel to say of any
person that he is a little blind to official duty, as that is
true of nearly every person who has held office. Everyone
knows that in the exercise of his duties an attorney
general must have a large discretion, and that an
apparent blindness may be on the side of charity in
accordance with his sense of duty.
59
It is a petty kindergarten case which should have
been heard and decided in two hours, and yet by the
unwise indulgence of the court, six distinguished
counselors were permitted to talk the case for two whole
days .
60
The one opinion that most delights aficionados of Robinson
opinions is probably his dissent in State ex rel. McCurdy v. Bennett. 61 It
involves the statute 62 that authorized a sheriff, upon a court order
(which could be obtained on the affidavit of the state's attorney, on
information and belief), to padlock an alleged bawdyhouse and its
contents and keep them closed until a court determination was
made as to whether it was a common nuisance. 63 Justice Robinson,
in a dissent to an opinion holding the statute constitutional, said:
[Blut shall we say that the McKenzie Hotel is a common
nuisance, and that it shall be closed for one year by reason
of the fact that to some extent it is or may be used, as all
hotels are used, for gambling, drinking, and forbidden
love? Shall we say that the grass and the parks are
nuisances to be destroyed because of use in that way?
Shall we say that, on mere affidavits and without trial by
jury, any party may be turned out of his house and
deprived of his liberty and property? Even Shylock
disdained to beg for life without his property. He said:
You take my life when you do take the means whereby I
live. 64
It should be noted that the McKenzie Hotel, now the Patterson,
was then the most luxurious hotel in North Dakota, and the
59. McCue v. Equity Coop. Publishing Co., 39 N.D. 190. 206, 167 N.W. 225.231 (1918).
60. Olson %. Ross, 39 N.D. 372. 384. 167 N.W. 385. 387 (1918).
61. 37 N.D. 465. 471, 163 N.W. 1063, 1065 (1917).
62. Compiled 1,aws of 1913. 9644-9645 (1914).
63. Id. 5 9644.
64. MCCurdy v. Bennett, 37 N.D. 465. 473. 163 N.W. 1063, 1066 (RobinsonJ., dissenting).
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favorite abode of legislators during the legislative sessions.
Justice Robinson wrote with abandon, striking out in all
directions, and wrote entertainingly. Actually, he knew more law
than he let on. Without citing authorities, he very often correctly
stated rules of law and constitutional provisions. When new law
was being made, he was often right, as we now view the questions
of law, in his opinions and dissents. At other times he was
hilariously wrong. But, in reading his opinions, one is often
tempted to concur in what .Justice Bruce once said, rather ruefully,
in a brief concurring opinion: "I concur in the judgment and law
announced by Mr. .Justice Robinson, though not perhaps in his
homilia. ''65
65. Wolfv. Wolf, 41 N.D. 109,111. 169 N.W. 577. 578(1918).
